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Abstract 
Integration between banks and insurers is a widely investigated trend in financial markets. 
Despite heterogeneity of bancassurance across countries, the financial crisis is reshaping 
both intermediaries and customers’ demand. While previous research provides evidence of 
economies of scale in bancassurance, we add to this literature by investigating differences 
due to alternative ownership models over an extended and recent period (1998-2012) and 
testing for the effects of the financial crisis through a translog cost function. We focus on the 
Italian market, where bancassurance dominates the life insurance market and all ownership 
models are present. We find that the cost function changed significantly after 2007 as new 
unexploited scale economies emerged, especially for independent insurers that showed 
earlier optimal returns to scale. More integrated groups, despite a remarkable difference in 
their trend for total costs, diverge in a similar fashion from independent insurers in terms of 
scale economies. 
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1. Introduction 
Consolidation and convergence processes impressively animated the evolution in the 
financial sector in recent years. An increasing removal of barriers between sectors, the 
achievement of a global market for capital flows and several major shifts towards prudential 
supervision allowed firms to aim at greater performances and efficiency to cope with an 
increased competition. From consumers' perspective, an easier access to a wider range of 
financial products enhanced the demand for less expensive, better performing and more 
sophisticated investment opportunities. 
Within this framework, bancassurance can be considered a keystone, since the early 
innovations dating back to 1965 in the UK to a wider penetration traceable to French and 
Spanish experiences of 1970s and 1980s. Distribution of insurance products through bank 
branches has been recently explored by an increasing number of European institutions, in 
spite of a high degree of heterogeneity in models and differences in market shares across 
countries. Among potential explanations for benefits and risks of this process, if retail 
markets and life insurance are considered, potential for cost synergies and distribution 
advantages still represent the main focus of bancassurance, due to cross-selling 
opportunities and joint back-office activities (asset management, human resources and IT).  
At the same time, different models of bancassurance exist and influence variability of 
advantages and successes across time and countries, in particular towards ownership 
models and their level of integration (distribution agreements, joint ventures and 
acquisitions, captive companies, mergers) [Hoschka (1994); Locatelli et al. (2003)].  
In this study we focus on the effects of bancassurance ownership models on scale 
economies. Despite a wide literature on scale economies or determinants of bancassurance 
exists, we add to previous research by jointly considering this aspect and by testing previous 
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findings in the post-crisis scenario, when we expect to find that adverse systemic market 
conditions increased scale inefficiencies. 
Our paper focuses on the Italian market and considers it a proper testing ground for 
several reasons. Since the 1990s, the Italian insurance industry has undergone major 
changes, after deregulation allowed banks to own controlling interests in the insurance 
sector. Unlike several other countries, banks entered an already mature market, fostering a 
significant product diversification and a noticeable reduction of distribution costs. The Italian 
life insurance market has been strongly influenced by bancassurance, where bank branches 
represent a comprehensive market share of 50 per cent, after exceeding 60 per cent in 2006 
[ANIA (2013)], whereas their importance is even higher when considering policies with 
higher levels of financial risks. The entrance of quasi-banking insurance products reshaped 
the industry in the 1990s throughout the mid 2000s and increased the exposure of market 
players to the financial crisis. Finally, all bancassurance models are present and active in the 
Italian market, allowing a comparative analysis of their performance.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the 
most relevant literature on this topic. In Section 3 we describe our data and methodology. In 
Section 4 we discuss our findings. Section 5 concludes our paper and provides our policy 
considerations and suggestions for further research.  
 
2. Literature review 
Within the European financial sector, the removal of regulatory barriers, the integration and 
harmonization processes within the single market and the evolution of the securities' 
industry pushed market players to pay greater attention on their efficiency in allocating 
resources in a more competitive environment. At the same time, the demand expressed 
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more sophisticated financial needs and contributed to the fast and heterogeneous 
expansion of bancassurance. Literature in this area can be connected to the broader field of 
mergers and acquisitions, where bancassurance is investigated from a number of different 
perspectives. We distinguish mainly two groups of contributions.  
The first stream involves qualitative and theoretical literature exploring the foundations 
and development of bancassurance. Accordingly to Chen et al. (2009), this is the most 
numerous if compared to more recent quantitative research. Banks and insurers express 
several similarities [Voutilainen (2005)] that underline potential benefits of convergence and 
cross-sector linkages [Bergendahl (1995); Kist (2001); Falautano and Marsiglia (2003); 
Staikouras (2006)], however with strategic and managerial challenges [Benoist (2002); 
Dorval (2002); Van den Berghe and Verweire (2001)]. Within the same stream, several 
authors have focused on specific markets to describe similarities or to compare evolutionary 
trends across countries, also encompassing convergence models between banks and 
insurers [Morgan et al. (1994); Verweire (1999); Benoist (2002); Dorval (2002); 
Lymberopoulos et al. (2004); Chevalier et al. (2005); Staikouras (2006); Kalotychou and 
Staikouras (2007); Artikis et al. (2008); Bikker and Van Leuvensteijn (2008)]. 
The second stream focuses on quantitative and empirical research with a number of 
different methodological perspectives. Within this literature we can distinguish between 
three major issues: the first encompasses equity wealth effects of bancassurance deals and 
the determinants of value creation, the second focuses on risk profiles of aggregations 
between banking and non-banking entities, while the third specifically addresses scale 
economies for this market. 
Regarding the first subset, few studies have provided evidence of positive size-related 
effects of mergers across the financial sector [Johnston and Madura (2000); Carow (2001a 
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and 2001b); Carow and Heron (2002)]. Diversification within financial conglomerates 
provides mixed evidence [Cowan et al. (2001)], from positive effects  due to scale economies 
[Templeton and Severiens (1992); Estrella (2001)] and market responses [Cybo-Ottone and 
Murgia (2000)], or even finding evidence of a discount factor placed on conglomerates due 
to agency conflicts [Laeven and Levine (2005)]. Research focused on bancassurance recently 
evidenced positive market reactions to mergers, with strong links with the benefits of 
economies of scale, scope and geographical diversification [Fields et al. (2007)]. Staikouras 
(2009) examines a global sample of major bancassurance ventures between 1990 and 2006 
through an event study methodology, finding significant positive returns for bank bidders, 
and significant losses for insurance-bidders. Moreover, results indicate that profitability and 
size of the deal are the major value drivers, while abnormal returns and functional 
diversification exhibit a negative relationship. Considering only deals with banks as acquirers, 
the relative deal size is found to be significantly value-enhancing also in Elasyani and 
Staikouras (2010). These results are consistent with Dontis-Charitos et al. (2011), who find 
positive stock market reactions to bancassurance deals for bank bidders, while for insurer 
bidders results are not significant. This could be explained within the contestable market 
theory, where the deal might reduce long-term profits for existing insurance firms and 
increase competition in the insurance market.  
The second subset focuses on the analysis of risks associated with bancassurance deals 
through GARCH methodologies, providing mixed results. Casu et al. (2011) find that, despite 
total and idiosyncratic risks of acquiring institutions are not affected significantly, an 
increase of systematic risk exposure of banks is observed. Looking at specific determinants 
of risk, they also find that results are driven by the size of operations. Elyasiani and 
Staikouras (2010) investigate international deals with banks as acquirers between 1990 and 
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2006, finding a decline in the overall risk exposure for the acquirer due to a decrease in 
unsystematic risk. This is interpreted as a consequence of the increased market share of 
conglomerates, raising concerns on a greater post-deal systemic risk exposure. 
The third quantitative subset investigates cost benefits of bancassurance and their link 
with competition: conglomerization is expected to grow until scale economies are depleted. 
On the role of bancassurance in Italy, Cummins et al. (1996) provide a pioneer study which, 
applying micro-econometric methodologies, investigates the effects on technical efficiency 
of technological changes in the insurance industry over the period 1985-1993. Results show 
no effects on efficiency and a significant decline in productivity, noticeably in years following 
banks’ entrance in the insurance market and attributable to a technological regress. 
Consistently, Turchetti and Daraio (2004) show that for motor insurance, not being affected 
by banks’ entry, results do not show strong variations either in efficiency or technological 
change over the period 1982-1993. Fiordelisi and Ricci (2011), employ a stochastic frontier 
methodology to analyze cost and profit efficiency due to distribution and bank ownership for 
the life insurance market in 2005-2006. They find evidence in favor of bancassurance in 
terms of cost efficiency stemming from firm-specific factors such as share of premiums 
collected through bank branches and proportion of quasi-banking products, whereas joint 
ventures’ specialization in financial products is negatively related with profit efficiency. 
Although looking at the relationship between bancassurance and efficiency, previous studies 
do not consider the effects on scale economies. 
Scale economies within the insurance sector have been investigated by several studies. 
Fecher et al. (1991) analyze the French life and non-life insurance market to address the 
optimal scale and productive efficiency of various institutional forms (stock, foreign, mutual 
and public companies), arguing that scale economies contribute to relatively high prices and 
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finding overall scale economies in life insurance, except for public entities. Bikker and Van 
Leuvensteijn (2008) and Bikker (2012), studying the Dutch life insurance industry, measure 
competition by looking at scale economies through a translog cost function and find the 
existence of substantial unused scale economies. Bikker (2012), following the structure-
conduct-performance paradigm, stresses the relevance of scale economies as a measure of 
competition and thus inefficiency. In the US, Houston and Simon (1970), Prichett (1971) and 
Cho (1986) find some evidence of increasing scale economies in the life sector in different 
years. Results on a more comprehensive sample provided by Grace and Timme (1992) show 
positive returns to scale for most firms (except for the largest agency companies). Kellner 
and Mathewson (1983), instead, find that firm size for the Canadian market is consistent 
with zero profits. More recently, Fenn et al. (2008) provide a cross-country research for 
Europe between 1995 and 2001, arguing that over this period most insurers were operating 
under increasing returns to scale. Focusing on the Italian market, Focarelli (1992) uses a 
translog cost function with cross-section data for 1987, i.e. before deregulation allowed 
banks to enter the insurance market: modest scale economies that increase moderately with 
company size are found and attributed to the maturity of the market.  
In Table 1 we provide a brief summary of the main output and input variables and proxies 
adopted by prominent literature on insurance and scale economies.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Although the choice of output proxies for the analysis of insurance industry has been 
widely debated, the majority of papers focused on insurance adopt the production approach 
[Fiordelisi and Ricci (2011); Bikker and Van Leuvensteijn (2008); Fenn et al. (2008)], 
consistently with Cummins and Weiss (1998), who define insurance output by looking at the 
value added in three main areas: 
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• Risk pooling/risk bearing activity: by insuring, life policyholders benefit from a risk 
pooling mechanism for the risks of premature death or survival. The actuarial and 
underwriting expenses incurred are important components of the value added by 
the industry, including holding equity capital to bear residual risks. 
• Real financial services relating to insured losses: insurers provide a variety of 
specialized services for policyholders, including financial planning and 
management of collective annuities and health insurance plans. 
• Intermediation: insurers invest premiums’ proceedings in assets that are not 
available to most investors (for instance privately placed bonds and structured 
securities). Insurers' value added is reflected in the net interest margin between 
returns earned on invested and those credited to policyholders. 
According to Cummins and Weiss (1998) output can be proxied by premium income or by 
the present value of incurred losses, incurred benefits can proxy the expected present value 
of future claims and, to take into account the intermediation function, additions to 
provisions are added to incurred claims. A minor stream in the literature refers to the 
intermediation approach [Focarelli (1992); Berger and Humphrey (1997); Brockett et al. 
(2005)], seeing financial institutions as primarily intermediating funds between savers and 
investors. Accordingly, the main insurers' activity is to borrow funds and transforming 
liabilities into assets, receiving and paying interests as a compensation for the time value of 
funds. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
We employ the database INFOBILA published by ANIA (Italian National Association of 
Insurance Companies). The database gathers financial statements and segment reporting for 
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about 90% of licensed companies in the Italian market. The raw sample consists of all direct 
life insurers collecting premiums from 1998 to 2012, leading to 1,314 firm-year observations. 
After eliminating unreliable (negative or zero values, since our models requires logarithms), 
not relevant (i.e. subject to liquidation processes) or missing data, we came to a refined 
unbalanced panel of 1,303 firm-year observations, with individual data deflated at 2012 
prices.  
Companies are then divided in groups depending on their ownership model, consistently 
with Fiordelisi and Ricci (2011). We reconstructed each company’s history through four main 
sources of information: 
• publicly available data from "Le Principali Società Italiane", edited by Mediobanca, 
which identifies insurance groups and related participating interests; 
• the database Zephir from Bureau Van Dijk, for data on mergers and acquisitions; 
• reports from the Italian Antitrust Authority (AGCM) on non-controlling participating 
interests; 
• companies’ websites and press releases. 
Companies are divided in three groups1: independent insurers, insurers totally owned by 
banks2 and joint ventures. Companies that are part of financial conglomerates are 
considered held by banks or insurers on the basis of the prominent activity of the whole 
group and their leading supervisory authority. 
Differences in output production and specialization across bancassurance models are 
summarized by Figure 1, presenting the relative market share of our three groups.  
                                                            
1 In an earlier version of this paper we divided our sample in six groups, considering intermediate 
levels of integration. However, additional groups showed poor statistical significance and a reduced 
number of observations: therefore, we focused on these three major models. 
2 Due to its particular nature, this group includes Postevita (controlled by Poste Italiane) which 
distributes insurance products exclusively through post branches.  
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[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Until 2005, bancassurers eroded independent insurers’ market shares. Then, just before 
the triggering of the financial crises, the latter recovered at the expense of insurers owned 
by banks, whereas more recently joint ventures’ seem to steadily lose ground compared to 
the other groups. This evolution can be explained by considering product differentiation at 
the firm’s level. The financial crisis impacted heavily the banking sector and affected quasi-
banking insurance products, such as unit-linked policies, which are mainly distributed by 
bancassurers. As a result, bancassurance groups and joint ventures in particular switched to 
more traditional and with-profits policies, especially those with guaranteed minimum 
returns, where independent insurers are still market leaders.  
To grasp these time-effects, we further detail our sample by considering two sub-periods, 
based on output growth and composition, as well as M&A waves that took place in this 
market and effects due to the financial crises: 
• 1998-2006: in this period unit- and index-linked products grew substantially and 
peaked in 2005-2006. The market experienced in 2004-2005 a wave of mergers and 
acquisitions: active companies were on average 94 per year. 
• 2007-2012: the post-crisis period sees traditional policies leading the overall output. 
The average number of active players is 76 per year.  
Table 2 shows the size of our sample, underlining how consolidation mainly invested 
independent insurers and companies owned by banks if compared to joint ventures.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of average total costs for the three bancassurance groups.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
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Total costs significantly increased in the analyzed span but at different paces, supporting 
the hypothesis of ownership model’s effects on cost efficiency. Independent insurers 
experienced a lower level almost constantly growing, whereas the two integrated groups 
behaved similarly until 2005 and, especially, diverging significantly after 2009.  
In order to analyze scale economies, we adopt the traditional translog cost function 
[Christensen et al. (1973)], which can be written, for the s-th company as: 
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ssssss
admdistradmydistryadm
distryadmdistryTC
εββββ
βββββα
+++++
++++++=
)ln()ln()ln()ln()ln()ln()ln(2/1
)ln(2/1)ln(2/1)ln()ln()ln(ln
231312
2
33
2
22
2
11321
 
 with ),0.(..~ 2εσε diis   (1) 
TC are total costs (incurred claims and benefits, change in technical provisions, bonuses 
and rebates, acquisition costs, administrative expenses, financial charges including those 
arising from contracts where the investment risk is borne by policyholders, other technical 
expenses, other operating expenses, non-operating expenses and income taxes, all gross of 
reinsurance); y represents gross written premiums [Bikker and Van Leuvensteijn (2008); 
Fecher et al. (1991)]; distr is the ratio between distribution costs and gross premiums as a 
proxy for the price of distribution channels [Fecher et al. (1991); Focarelli (1992)]; adm is the 
ratio between administrative expenses and gross written premiums as a proxy for the price 
of human resources, marketing and IT activities. Unlike Fenn et al. (2008) and Fiordelisi and 
Ricci (2011) we do not extend the model to variables exogenous to accounting data, such as 
proxies for investment returns, debt capital or labor costs, because of scarce availability of 
market data able to discriminate between production technologies for our three groups. 
Estimations are carried through a mixed-effect panel data model [Laird and Ware (1982)], 
where the individual company effect is treated as a random effect: the individual-specific 
constant terms are seen as randomly distributed across cross-sectional units. Data are 
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grouped in order to consider individual firms throughout time: every group is composed by 
the various observations of the same individual in different years.  
For the single group or firm (s) the model takes the following form: 
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The term stsb ε+  is the stochastic part of the model encompassing the stochastic error 
stε  and the random-effect sb , which depends only from the individual and is randomly 
distributed. The term tγ is the dummy fixed-effect for time, independent from the individual 
company. The term ψψ ss DD 322 +  is a dummy for the bancassurance model, treated as a 
fixed-effect (respectively, for insurers owned by banks and joint ventures). The other terms 
are the independent variables of the translog cost function. We estimate the coefficients of 
the model using a restricted maximum likelihood estimator (REML)3.  
In order to check for the existence of scale economies, we employ a typical measure of 
output’s cost-elasticity [Clark (1988)]. In the case of a multiproduct firm, scale economies or 
diseconomies exist if the derivative of total costs with respect to output is significantly 
different from the unity:  
 ∂∂i i sy
TC
)ln(
)ln(
 (3)
 
Since our production function considers only one output: 
                                                            
3 For a review of restricted maximum likelihood estimators, see Harville (1977). More details on the 
methodology used in this paper are provided in the Appendix. 
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indicates economies of scale.  
The statistical significance is based on a Wald Chi-square test with the null-hypothesis 
being the elasticity equal to one and with constraints vectors fixed to mean values for each 
bancassurance group. 
Given the translog function described by Equation 1, elasticity results as follows:  
)ln()ln()ln(
)ln(
)ln(
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∂
∂
      (4) 
From the translog specification, the change in elasticity as output changes is given by yyβ . 
The coefficient of the squared output is determinant in analyzing the existence of scale 
economies: if positive, it indicates that smaller firms experience larger cost benefits on 
additional production. 
 
4 Empirical findings and discussion 
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics for our data.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The mean of the dependent variable (i.e. total costs), for the two spans is higher for 
groups II and III in comparison to the sample mean. All three groups experienced an increase 
in total costs in the second sub-period but with different sizes: independent insurers by 
almost 58 per cent, companies owned by banks by 67 per cent and joint ventures by almost 
9 per cent. Insurers linked to banks are on average larger in terms of premiums than 
independent insurers. The average output growth is higher for independent insurers and 
bank-owned entities in more recent years (respectively, by around 65 and 60 per cent), 
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whereas joint ventures decreased in output by 3.5 per cent. The incidence of distribution 
and administrative costs on premiums appears lower for bancassurance models, although 
insurers owned by banks show a higher dispersion in terms of distribution prices in more 
recent years. Finally, distribution costs have been slightly increasing over the period 1998-
2012, whereas administrative costs decreased only in more recent years. 
The first set of results obtained from our regression is summarized in Table 4.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Distribution costs as a share of written premiums do not explain the variability of total 
costs. Written premiums and the administrative costs ratio, instead, are both positive and 
significant for both periods. However, the two sub-periods present different cost functions. 
In early years, the cost function is homothetic: output-prices cross-products coefficients 12β
and 13β  are not significantly different from zero. In more recent years, instead, 13β  is 
significantly different from zero and exhibits a negative sign. Moreover, in 2007–2012 the 
own output elasticity 11β reveals a negative sign. In presence of a negative coefficient, as in 
our case for 2007-2012, unexhausted scale economies are more likely for bigger firms, 
possibly implying that further consolidation would not be efficient. The more recent sub-
period is also characterized by a higher volatility, attributable to the systemic shock due to 
the financial crises.  
Table 5 presents results referred to the time-effect. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Coefficients for the time dummy consider the first year in each sub-period as its 
benchmark. We find significant coefficients only for 2008 and 2009, following the triggering 
of the financial crises. We argue that changes in the demand and turbulence in financial 
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markets impacted heavily the whole bancassurance market and enhanced differences in cost 
efficiency across firms regardless of their ownership model.  
Table 6 presents the group-effect, analyzed by taking independent insurers as our 
benchmark: dummies’ coefficients therefore measure if bancassurers on average show 
differences in total costs if compared to independent insurers. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Our three groups do not show significant cost differences in the first sub-period, while 
bancassurance models diverge significantly from independent insurers in the aftermath of 
the financial crises. These results might reinforce the hypothesis that, despite diversification 
benefits for bancassurance ventures normally exist, the financial crises exposed higher cost 
levels for more integrated models.  
The latter finding should be completed by investigating the existence of scale economies: 
results deriving from Equation 4 are presented in Table 7.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Our first sub-period is characterized by the presence of scale diseconomies for 
bancassurance groups, due to average higher premium collection mainly through bank 
branches, while independent companies show constant returns to scale. The higher cost 
efficiency and lower profit efficiency of bancassurers before the financial crisis [Fiordelisi and 
Ricci (2011)] may have led these groups to overcome the optimal production scale within a 
slightly increasing demand for unit- and index-linked products. In more recent years, 
however, we find diffused scale economies, which is consistent with recent results for other 
European countries [Bikker (2012)]. The crisis that hit the financial industry led to wide 
changes in the demand for quasi-banking and traditional insurance products, as well as a 
shift across these products as investors moved from riskier investments to safer traditional 
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or with-profit policies. This temporary shock on institutions and demand seem to have 
restored some scale economies that are lower for bancassurance groups. Finally, since the 
market showed an overall good level of competition and consolidation in 1998-2006, from 
our results it could be argued that scale inefficiency emerging from the financial crises might 
fade in forthcoming years as market players adapt to new market conditions.  
 
5 Conclusions 
The theoretical literature predicts the existence of cost-efficiency benefits for life insurers 
adopting bancassurance models, despite empirical contributions do not always lead to 
consistent finding. Different forms of bancassurance integration co-exist (distribution 
channels, back-office activities, conglomerates) and alternative ownership models may 
influence advantages and risks for banks and insurers. 
Examining a unique dataset on all active Italian life insurers from 1998 to 2012, we search 
for cost benefits and scale economies explained by ownership models. We focus on the 
Italian market because of the relevance of bancassurance, the presence of all integration 
forms, its importance within Europe market and the recent entry of banks in an already 
mature insurance sector. 
We distinguish between three groups of entities, based on the strength of their 
integration with the banking sector. We test for the existence of scale economies within 
each group through a mixed-effect model of a translog cost function. In order to assess the 
effects of product diversification, consolidation and the financial crises, we consider two 
separate time spans: therefore, we are able also to control for industry-wide time-effects. 
We add to the existing literature by finding that bancassurers do not overperform 
independent insurers in terms of scale economies. Before 2007, insurers owned by banks 
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and joint ventures seem to have exceeded the optimum level of output and show modest 
scale diseconomies. On the contrary, independent insurers appear in equilibrium in the 
same period. The post-crisis period, however, shows that changes in demand and shocks in 
the financial sector generated scale economies for all groups, but in particular for 
independent insurers. The life insurance market operated with different cost functions 
before and after the crisis, with no significant explanatory power of distribution costs. 
Therefore, we provide additional evidence that the level of scale economies can change 
significantly in a mature market when external shocks reshape market conditions. Moreover, 
a product mix favoring traditional and with-profits policies could imply a more stable 
environment for independent insurers. Finally, unexhausted scale economies in the post-
crisis sub-period and the negative coefficient for the own output elasticity might suggest to 
competition authorities and policymakers that a new consolidation phase within the life 
insurance industry would not be efficient. 
This analysis is limited by not considering specific exogenous variables to control for 
effects of bank branches in distribution channels, as in Fiordelisi and Ricci (2011), i.e. not 
considering less integrated cross-selling agreements for which scarce data is publicly 
available and that could represent a major extension of our model. Finally, we acknowledge 
that future developments of this stream of research should include variables exogenous to 
accounting data and able to discriminate between production technologies across 
bancassurance groups. 
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Tables and figures 
Table 1: Input and output metrics 
 
 
Output Output proxies Input/netput Input prices proxies
Focarelli (1992) (i) flow of direct 
insurance  
(ii) flow of reinsurance 
(iii) flow of financial 
management 
(iv) flow of real estate 
management 
Attribution of 
operating revenues 
and expenses to 
the four output 
areas 
Labor
Capital 
Commercial 
network 
HP of perfect 
competitive labor and 
capital markets. Cross 
section one year data: 
distribution costs as 
ratio between 
commercial expenses 
and premiums 
Fiordelisi and 
Ricci (2011) 
Expected present 
value of future claims 
Net claims paid, 
plus bonuses and 
rebates, plus 
addition to 
provisions 
Equity
Technical 
Provisions (as 
netputs) 
Business services 
and materials (as 
inputs) 
Investments 
Ratio of net operating 
expenses and technical 
charges on total assets 
(technical costs) 
Ratio of investment 
charges on total assets 
(investment costs) 
Fenn et al. 
(2008) 
Expected present 
value of future claims 
Net claims paid, 
plus bonuses and 
rebates, plus 
addition to 
provisions 
Total capital and 
reserves 
Total technical 
provisions 
Debt capital 
HP of competitive input 
markets. Nominal 
insurance wages. 
Long term government 
bond rates as price of 
debt capital 
Bikker and Van 
Leuvensteijn 
(2008) 
 Premium income Reinsurance 
Distribution  
Reinsurance ratio 
Acquisition ratio  
Fecher et al. 
(1991) 
 Premium income
Claims 
Reinsurance 
Distribution  
Reinsurance ratio 
Acquisition ratio 
Source: own elaboration 
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Figure 1: Life insurance market share and ownership model 
 
Source: own elaboration on ANIA-INFOBILA database 
Groups are defined as follows: Group I are insurers independent from banks, Group II are insurers totally 
controlled by banks, Group III are insurers jointly held by banks and other insurers. Market shares are based on 
gross written premiums. 
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Table 2: Sample size  
 Group I Group II Group III Total 
1998 67 15 15 97 
1999 65 15 16 96 
2000 65 14 17 96 
2001 61 16 20 97 
2002 61 19 18 98 
2003 61 17 17 95 
2004 58 15 19 92 
2005 55 14 20 89 
2006 54 13 20 87 
2007 51 14 20 85 
2008 47 14 21 82 
2009 43 13 21 77 
2010 40 14 21 75 
2011 41 11 19 71 
2012 38 10 18 66 
1998-2006 547 138 162 847 
2007-2012 260 76 120 456 
Total firm-year obs. 807 214 282 1,303 
 
Groups are defined as follows: Group I are insurers independent from banks, Group II are insurers totally 
controlled by banks, Group III are insurers jointly held by banks and other insurers. 
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Figure 2: Average total costs and ownership model 
 
Source: own elaboration on ANIA INFOBILA Database 
Groups are defined as follows: Group I are insurers independent from banks, Group II are insurers totally 
controlled by banks, Group III are insurers jointly held by banks and other insurers. Average total costs are 
calculated as the within-group average of incurred claims and benefits, change in technical provisions, bonuses 
and rebates, acquisition costs, administrative expenses, financial charges including those arising from contracts 
where the investment risk is borne by policyholders, other technical expenses, other operating expenses, non-
operating expenses and income taxes, all gross of reinsurance. 
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Table 3: Main descriptive statistics 
  TC: Total costs ('000 Euro) 
1998-2006 2007-2012 
  Mean St. dev. Median Min Max Mean St. dev. Median Min Max 
Group I 771 1,409 210 <1 9,280 1,215 2,163 286 1 11,345
Group II 1,284 1,702 578 26 8,139 2,145 3,313 695 20 13,335
Group III 1,316 1,777 722 7 10,812 1,432 1,634 793 27 6,495
TOTAL 959 1,554 344 <1 10,812 1,427 2,298 460 1 13,335
  Y: Output ('000 Euro) 
  1998-2006  2007-2012 
  Mean St. dev. Median Min Max Mean St. dev. Median Min Max 
Group I 504 912 137 <1 6,810 829 1,574 194 <1 9,418
Group II 1,028 1,341 468 24 6,763 1,641 2,610 499 11 10,517
Group III 1,103 1,474 589 6 9,104 1,064 1,259 534 17 5,432
TOTAL 704 1,147 272 <1 9,104 1,026 1,742 355 <1 10,517
  DISTR: Distribution costs ratio 
  1998-2006  2007-2012 
  Mean St. dev. Median Min Max Mean St. dev. Median Min Max 
Group I 0.0852 0.0684 0.0701 0.0014 0.4890 0.0840 0.1157 0.0540 0.0003 0.7194
Group II 0.0569 0.0663 0.0403 0.0120 0.4618 0.0741 0.1386 0.0320 0.0035 0.6237
Group III 0.0426 0.0288 0.0341 0.0118 0.1937 0.0523 0.0901 0.0297 0.0024 0.5799
TOTAL 0.0724 0.0648 0.0538 0.0014 0.4890 0.0740 0.1144 0.0436 0.0003 0.7194
  ADM: Administrative costs ratio 
  1998-2006  2007-2012 
  Mean St. dev. Median Min Max Mean St. dev. Median Min Max 
Group I 0.0608 0.1028 0.0303 0.0018 0.8672 0.0488 0.0785 0.0267 0.0020 0.6136
Group II 0.0143 0.0131 0.0105 0.0010 0.0833 0.0223 0.0285 0.0127 0.0023 0.1318
Group III 0.0130 0.0172 0.0068 0.0020 0.1213 0.0238 0.0347 0.0112 0.0027 0.2114
TOTAL 0.0441 0.0861 0.0206 0.0010 0.8672 0.0378 0.0642 0.0202 0.0020 0.6136
                       
 
Groups are defined as follows: Group I are insurers independent from banks, Group II are insurers totally 
controlled by banks, Group III are insurers jointly held by banks and other insurers. All variables are gross of 
reinsurance and expressed at 2012 prices. Accounting data is obtained from the public database INFOBILA, 
issued by ANIA (Italian National Association of Insurance Companies). TC are the sum of incurred claims and 
benefits, change in technical provisions, bonuses and rebates, acquisition costs, administrative expenses, 
financial charges including those arising from contracts where the investment risk is borne by policyholders, 
other technical expenses, other operating expenses, non-operating expenses and income taxes, all gross of 
reinsurance; Y are gross written premiums, DISTR is the ratio between distribution costs and gross written 
premiums, ADM is the ratio between administrative expenses and gross written premiums. 
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Table 4: Cost Function Estimates 
 
Variable 
1998 -2006   2007-2012 
Beta Std.Err. t-value  Beta Std.Err. t-value 
Const. 
2.1002 *** 0.2566 8.1859 1.1544 * 0.5401 2.1374 
(<0,001) (0.0333) 
log(y) 
0.8481 *** 0.0518 16.3768 1.2520 *** 0.1144 10.9454 
(<0,001) (<0.001) 
log(distr) 
0.0966 0.0614 1.5728 0.0153 0.0859 0.1785 
(0,1162) (0.8585) 
log(adm) 
0.2879 *** 0.0608 4.7325 0.8682 *** 0.1476 5.8807 
(<0,001) (<0.001) 
log(y)^2 
0.0117 * 0.0027 2.2000 -0.0390 ** 0.0064 -3.0572 
(0.0281) (0.0024) 
log(distr)^2 
0.0124 * 0.0055 2.2617 -0.0117 0.0066 -0.8793 
(0.0240) (0.3799) 
log(adm)^2 
0.0148 0.0075 0.9824 0.0127 0.0191 0.3327 
(0.3262) (0.7396) 
log(y) log(distr) 
0.0002 0.0062 0.0386 -0.0011 0.0095 -0.1128 
(0.9692) (0.9103) 
log(y) log(adm) 
-0.0085 0.0069 -1.2293 -0.0447 * 0.0184 -2.4344 
(0.2194) (0.0154) 
log(distr) log(adm) 
-0.0033 0.0107 -0.3075 0.0161 0.0164 0.9790 
(0.7586)      (0.3283)     
AIC -945.2907 -162.3320 
BIC -841.4990 -84.7240 
Log-likelihood 494.6453 100.1663 
 
Significance codes: ‘***’ expresses significance at the 0.999 level, ‘**’ at 0.99 and ‘*’ at 0.95 
 
The table illustrates Betas and p-values for the translog cost function within the model described in Equation 2. 
Y are gross written premiums, DISTR is the ratio between distribution costs and gross written premiums, ADM is 
the ratio between administrative expenses and gross written premiums. The goodness-of-fit is measured by the 
AIC (Akaike information criterion), the BIC (Bayesian information criterion) and the log-likelihood of the entire 
model described in Equation 2.  
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Table 5: Time Effect Estimates 
Year 
1998 – 2006 
Gamma Std. Err. t-value 
1999 
0.0135 0.0151 0.8977 
(0.3696)   
2000 
-0.0184 0.0152 -1.2141 
(0.2251)   
2001 
-0.0082 0.0154 -0.5349
(0.5929)   
2002 
0.0053 0.0156 0.3372 
(0.7361)   
2003 
0.0045 0.0159 0.2817 
(0.7783)
2004 
-0.0049 0.0163 -0.3022 
(0.7626)   
2005 
0.0152 0.0167 0.9062 
(0.3652)   
2006 
0.0097 0.0169 0.5757
(0.5650)     
Year 
2007 – 2012 
Gamma Std. Err. t-value 
2008 
0.0702 *** 0.0205 3.4181 
(<0.001)   
2009 
0.0809 *** 0.0218 3.7164 
(<0.001)
2010 
0.0272 0.0228 1.1931 
(0.2336)   
2011 
0.0302 0.0224 1.3488 
(0.1783)   
2012 
-0.0131 0.0232 -0.5647
(0.5726)     
 
Significance codes: ‘***’ expresses significance at the 0.999 level 
 
The table illustrates the time effect within the model described by Equation 2 ( tγ ), together with standard 
errors, t-test and p-values. Each period is analyzed by comparison to a benchmark year, respectively 1998 and 
2007. 
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Table 6: Group Effect Estimates 
Group 
1998 – 2006   2007 – 2012 
Psi Std.Err. t-value   Psi Std.Err. t-value 
Group II 
-0.0482 0.0279 -1.7285 0.1557 
*** 
0.0464 3.3529 
(0.0843)    (<0.001)   
Group III 
-0.0125 0.0254 -0.4918  0.1686 
*** 
0.0402 4.1975 
(0.6230) (<0.001)     
AIC -945.2907  -162.3320 
BIC -841.4990  -84.7240 
Log-likelihood 494.6453 100.1663 
 
Significance codes: ‘***’ expresses significance at the 0.999 level 
 
The table illustrates the group effect within the model described by Equation 2 as ψD , together with standard 
errors, t-test and p-values. Groups are defined as follows: Group I are insurers independent from banks, Group II 
are insurers totally controlled by banks, Group III are insurers jointly held by banks and other insurers. Each 
period is analyzed by comparison to a benchmark group (Group I). The goodness-of-fit is measured by the AIC 
(Akaike information criterion), the BIC (Bayesian information criterion) and the log-likelihood of the entire 
model described in Equation 2. 
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Table 7: Scale economies 
Group 
1998 – 2006   2007 – 2012 
Elasticity ࣑૛   Elasticity ࣑૛ 
Group I 
1.012 3.244 0.857 ** 10.283
(0.071) (0.001)
Group II 
1.040 *** 25.705  0.933 *** 14.902 
(<0.001) (<0.001)
Group III 
1.041 *** 25.756  0.942 *** 11.137 
(<0.001)     (<0.001)   
 
Significance codes: ‘***’ expresses significance at the 0.999 level, ‘**’ at 0.99 and ‘*’ at 0.95 
 
The table illustrates the elasticity of total costs with respect to output as described by Equation 4, together with 
the Wald Chi-square test and p-values. Groups are defined as follows: Group I are insurers independent from 
banks, Group II are insurers totally controlled by banks, Group III are insurers jointly held by banks and other 
insurers. 
 
 
 
  
31 
 
APPENDIX   
LINEAR MIXED EFFECT MODELS 
In analyzing panel data we rely on fixed effects if we assume that differences across 
individuals are characterized by differences of the constant term. However, multiple 
measurements for each individual, such as repeated observation over time, generally result 
in correlation of within-subjects’ errors. Moreover, considerable variation among individuals 
in number and timing of observations might often affect data. The resulting unbalanced 
datasets are typically not effectively analyzed using a general multivariate model with 
unrestricted covariance structure [Laird and Ware (1982)]. Instead, data of this form can be 
analyzed using a variant of a two-stage model, generally referred to as mixed-effects models. 
In this formulation, the probability distribution for the multiple measurements has the same 
form for each individual, but parameters of that distribution are allowed to vary across 
individuals. The distribution of these parameters or random effects in the population 
constitutes the second stage of the model [Laird and Ware (1982)]. 
In our analysis we use a particular type of mixed-effect models considering only random 
intercepts for subjects and a constant slope with respect to the covariates. In this approach, 
fixed effects describe patterns of change in the mean response over time in the population, 
while the random variables represent the individual’s deviation from the population mean 
intercept, after the covariates have been accounted for. In order to consider variations 
among repeated observations of the same individual, data are clustered in groups composed 
by observations for individual (s) over time. The hierarchical notation is as follows: 
sssssts bZXDaTC εβψγ +++++=  
With ),0(...~ 2 INdii εσε  and b ),0(....~ ΦNdii . 
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TC is the response vector which comprises the logarithm of the total costs, α  is the 
vector for the general intercept, tγ  is the dummy for the time effect, ψD  includes the 
dummy matrix D and the coefficients vector ψ to be estimated in order to grasp the effect of 
ownership models, βX  comprises the matrix X with the logarithms of the cost function 
variables and the vector of coefficient β  to be estimated, ε+Zb  is the stochastic part of the 
model which encompasses the stochastic error term sε , a random variable sb  and ssZ 1=  to 
include only random intercept and constant slope. Finally, Φ  is a positive definite 
symmetrical matrix independent from s. 
The parameters have been estimated through the restricted maximum likelihood 
approach (REML) using the “nlme” package of R. For a literature review on estimates 
through maximum likelihood, see Harville (1977). 
 
